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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal has its origin in BAPS's1 application to the 
North Bergen Board of Adjustment ("BOA or "the Board") 
for a use variance which would permit BAPS to use the 
subject property as a temple for Hindu worship. BAPS had 
agreed to purchase the property fr om the trustee in 
bankruptcy for Four Three Oh, Inc. on the condition that it 
receive approval from the Township of North Bergen for its 
desired use. The application process dragged on for over 
two years, and finally culminated in the BOA's insistence 
that BAPS hire off-duty police officers to direct traffic and 
insure compliance with the occupancy limit for the temple 
set by the BOA. The Bankruptcy Court held that this 
condition was unreasonable and issued an injunction 
requiring the BOA to allow BAPS to use its own uniformed 
volunteers for traffic direction and occupancy limit 
compliance. The BOA appealed this order to the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which 
affirmed. The Board timely appealed to this Court. We also 
affirm. 
 
I. 
 
This controversy began in November of 1998, when the 
United States Bankruptcy Court approved the sale to BAPS 
of the subject property which previously had been owned 
by Four Three Oh, Inc., a debtor in Chapter 11 
proceedings. The sale of the property, which had been used 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. BAPS is an acronym. The full name of the organization is 
Bochasanwasi Shree Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha. 
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by the prior owner as a nightclub, was contingent upon 
BAPS obtaining permission from the BOA to use the land 
as a house of worship. 
 
BAPS applied to the Township of North Ber gen for a 
Certificate of Occupancy to permit the pr operty to be used 
as a place of worship. Because the property is located in an 
industrial zone, the Township denied the application on the 
ground that a use variance was requir ed under New Jersey 
law. BAPS then filed an application for the necessary use 
variance with the BOA, who scheduled the matter for a 
hearing in January, 1999. 
 
Over the next several months, the BOA repeatedly 
postponed the hearing. As a result, the Chapter 11 trustee 
and BAPS jointly commenced an adversary proceeding in 
the Bankruptcy Court seeking an injunction r equiring the 
BOA to grant BAPS's pending application for a variance. 
The Bankruptcy Court denied the injunction, but r emanded 
the matter to the BOA for a hearing, ordering it to issue a 
final decision on the BAPS application by October 6, 1999. 
 
The first remand hearing occurred on September 22, 
1999. The BOA heard testimony from several experts, 
including Derrick McGrath, the BOA's engineer , who 
identified numerous problems with the site that BAPS 
needed to address. Most of these problems were later 
discussed by BAPS's engineer, Bhaskar Halari, who 
explained that BAPS could and would remedy them. One of 
the chief problems McGrath identified was the fear that the 
property had insufficient parking spaces to accommodate 
its anticipated use. In response to this concer n, Kishor 
Joshi, BAPS's architect, testified that BAPS was willing to 
limit the temple's occupancy based on the number of 
available parking spaces. 
 
The number of parking spaces that would be available for 
worshippers' use is a matter of dispute. Part of the land on 
which the former nightclub was situated is currently leased 
to a fast food restaurant (Taco Bell). Although Taco Bell's 
lease is silent on the issue of parking, Michael Kauker, the 
North Bergen town planner, had pr eviously testified that, 
based on the number of seats in Taco Bell, the restaurant 
was entitled to exclusive use of 27 parking spaces. Joshi 
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accepted this conclusion and calculated that the temple 
would be left with 165 spaces. He offer ed to limit the 
occupancy of the temple to 3.5 persons per parking space, 
or 578 persons. 
 
The BOA then heard testimony from Michael Maris, 
BAPS's traffic expert. He testified that he had studied the 
traffic conditions on the avenue adjacent to the property 
and, using a "peak load factor" of .9, he calculated that the 
property would have a C Level of Service,2 acceptable under 
Federal standards. Maris based this calculation on BAPS's 
agreement to limit itself to 165 parking spaces. 
 
On September 28, 1999, the BOA heard testimony from 
its own traffic consultant, Hal Simoff. Using the same 
methodology as Maris, he concluded that the temple's 
driveways would operate unsafely, with a level of service 
rating of F. However, Simoff used a peak load factor of .7, 
which, on cross examination, he conceded was incorrect. 
He then agreed that a peak load factor of .82 would be 
more appropriate and would yield a D Level of Service, 
which Maris testified was still acceptable (under federal 
standards). Simoff later testified that, based on his reading 
of the metes and bounds description in the T aco Bell lease, 
Taco Bell was entitled to 65 parking spaces. Although it 
received notice of this litigation, Taco Bell never appeared 
or asserted any claim. 
 
Between the second and final scheduled hearing dates, 
BAPS wrote a letter to the BOA offering to limit its 
occupancy to 505 persons, even though the number of 
available parking spaces would permit a building 
occupancy of 578 persons under the relevant North Bergen 
ordinance. Under the ordinance, a building with an 
occupancy limit of 505 required only 143 parking spaces. 
 
The final hearing on the BAPS application took place on 
October 6, 1999. Simoff again testified at this hearing, but 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A property's "Level of Service" r efers to the amount of time it takes 
a 
vehicle to exit the driveway. Level of Service A means a delay time of 
less 
than ten seconds. Level of Service F, which is generally unacceptable, 
means a delay time of greater than 50 seconds. The property currently 
operates with a "B" Level of Service. 
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this time he limited his testimony to BAPS's existing facility 
in nearby Edison Township. Simoff claimed that BAPS had 
misrepresented its proposed use of that facility before the 
Edison land use board and that BAPS had made 
architectural changes to the Edison building without first 
obtaining the requisite municipal approval. However, Simoff 
once again retracted his testimony on cr oss-examination 
when confronted with approved site plans for the Edison 
facility. These plans proved that BAPS had, in fact, 
obtained the approval of the township befor e altering its 
building. 
 
At the end of the final hearing, the BOA denied BAPS's 
application for a variance, citing occupancy, traffic, and 
parking problems. BAPS appealed this decision to the 
Bankruptcy Court, which reversed the denial, concluding 
that the Board had acted arbitrarily in r efusing to consider 
reasonable restrictions that would alleviate problems with 
occupancy, parking, ingress and egress. The Court 
remanded the application back to the Boar d to consider 
such restrictions. 
 
On remand, the BOA required, as a condition of granting 
the variance, that BAPS hire off-duty police officers to 
monitor traffic entering and exiting its parking lot. This 
condition was financially burdensome and, as it turned out, 
impossible to fulfill, because the chief of police later 
informed BAPS that off-duty officers were not available. The 
BOA refused BAPS's offer to have its own volunteers 
perform this function, and BAPS once again brought the 
matter to the attention of the Bankruptcy Court. This time, 
the Court held that this condition was arbitrary and 
unreasonable. It vacated the proposed condition and 
ordered BAPS's application for a variance approved, 
allowing BAPS volunteers to monitor the trafficflow in the 
temple parking lot. The BOA appealed this or der to the 
District Court, which affirmed. 
 
II. 
 
The first question before us is whether the District Court 
applied the correct standard of review. The District Court 
reviewed the bankruptcy court's factual findings for clear 
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error, while subjecting its legal conclusions to plenary 
review. Although this is the standard that normally applies 
to appeals from bankruptcy decisions, see In re Sharon 
Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir . 1989), this case 
reached the District Court in an unusual pr ocedural 
posture. The Bankruptcy Court had effectively reviewed the 
decision of the Board of Adjustment, an administrative 
body created under state law. Under similar cir cumstances, 
the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit explained the 
standard of review as follows: 
 
       [W]e are reviewing neither the legal rulings of the 
       bankruptcy court nor its findings of fact. W e are 
       reviewing the judgment of a district court affirming a 
       bankruptcy court decision giving effect to a decision of 
       the [administrative agency]. In substance, we are 
       reviewing the decision of an administrative agency. 
 
Id. at 1390 (internal citations omitted). 
 
When a federal court reviews a decision of a state agency, 
it must grant that agency's factual findings the same degree 
of deference to which they would be entitled if they were 
reviewed by a state court. See AT&T W ireless PCS v. 
Winston-Salem Zoning Board, 172 F .3d 307, 315 (4th Cir. 
1999). If the BOA's decision had been reviewed in the state 
court system, the Law Division of the New Jersey Superior 
Court would have exercised a deferential standard of 
review. Its review would have been limited to determining 
whether the BOA's decision was supported by "substantial 
evidence" and whether it was "arbitrary, unr easonable or 
capricious." Pullen v. S. Plainfield Planning Bd., 291 N.J. 
Super 303, 311-12, 677 A.2d 278, 282 (Law Div. 
1995)("Pullen I"). The Law Division would have acted as a 
reviewing court, not a trial court, and would have reviewed 
the BOA's factual findings based on the recor d of the 
proceedings before the BOA. See Pullen I, 291 N.J. Super at 
312. 
 
On appeal, the Appellate Division's review of the Law 
Division's decision would have been de novo. The Appellate 
Division would have conducted its own review of the record 
before the BOA, using the same arbitrary and capricious 
standard. See Pullen v. Township of S. Plainfield Planning 
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Bd., 291 N.J. Super. 1, 6, 676 A.2d 1095, 1097(App. Div. 
1996)("Pullen II"). 
 
In this case, the Bankruptcy Court applied the corr ect, 
deferential standard of review, but the District Court did 
not. When the Bankruptcy Court's decision was appealed to 
the District Court, the District Court functioned as a 
second-level reviewing court. Its standar d of review should 
have been plenary. See, e.g. AT&T Wireless, 172 F.3d at 
314-315; C.K. v. New Jersey Dept. of Health & Human 
Services, 92 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1996); Bankruptcy Estate of 
United Shipping v. General Mills, 34 F.3d 1387 (8th Cir. 
1994). 
 
In similar cases in which the District Court, functioning 
in an appellate capacity, applied the wrong standard of 
review, we have nevertheless reached the merits of the 
appeal.3 In light of the alr eady long duration of this 
litigation in the court below, we will not r emand but decide 
the merits. For reasons fully discussed her einafter, we 
believe the record of the BOA proceedings reveal that it 
acted arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably in denying 
the variance sought by BAPS. As we explain in Part III, the 
District Court did not err in affirming the decision of the 
Bankruptcy Court. 
 
III. 
 
Under New Jersey law, a town planning board should 
grant a variance for a proposed land use that is "inherently 
beneficial" if the applicant satisfies a four -prong test. See 
Sica v. Board of Adjustment of the Township of Wall, 127 
N.J. 152, 165-66 (1992). The parties here agr ee that the 
proposed temple constitutes an "inher ently beneficial" use 
of the subject property. Accordingly, the Sica decision 
requires the BOA to first identify the public interest 
involved and then identify the "detrimental ef fect that will 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See, e.g., In re Marcus Hook Dev. Park, Inc., 943 F.2d 261, 263 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1991)(finding that the District Court had applied the wrong standard 
of review when reviewing a Bankruptcy Court's decision and proceeding 
to reach the merits of the appeal); In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 
58 
& 59-60 (3d Cir. 1988)(same). 
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ensue from the grant of the variance." Id. at 165-66. Next, 
the Board should, when possible, consider r easonable 
conditions on the use that would reduce its detrimental 
effect. See id. Finally, the Boar d should "weigh the positive 
and negative criteria and determine whether , on balance, 
the grant of the variance would cause a substantial 
detriment to the public good." Id. In doing so, the Board 
should reduce the weight of the negative criteria to the 
extent that their effect could be reduced by the imposition 
of reasonable conditions. See id. 
 
We agree with the District Court and the Bankruptcy 
Court that the Board failed to seriously undertake the 
balancing test required by Sica. The BOA cited three 
negative criteria to support its denial of the variance: 
alleged overuse of the BAPS facility in Edison, a shortage of 
parking, and traffic problems. The recor d shows little 
support for any of these concerns. First, as the Bankruptcy 
Court noted, there is no evidence in the r ecord, except for 
Simoff 's discredited testimony, to support the allegation 
that BAPS misrepresented its anticipated use to the Edison 
board. 
 
The Board also relied on Simoff 's admittedly faulty 
analysis to support the conclusion that BAPS's pr oposed 
use of the site would cause traffic problems. Simoff himself 
conceded that the peak load factor used by BAPS's traffic 
expert, which led to the conclusion that the T emple would 
not unduly hamper traffic, was more appr opriate than the 
one he used, and would yield an acceptable Level of 
Service. Thus, we agree that the Board's r eliance on 
Simoff 's traffic calculations was unr easonable.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The dissent contends that Simoff 's error in calculation "related only 
to 
the ability of cars to exit the proposed temple's parking lot, leaving 
unaffected any conclusions about . . . the ability of cars to enter the 
lot." 
(Dis. op. at 16). However, Maris testified that the ability of vehicles to 
exit 
the site was the most critical consideration in analyzing the feasibility 
of 
the proposed use. He stated that, because cars attempting to enter the 
proposed lot only need to make a right tur n off Route 1 and 9, "the 
entering traffic is not critical." He also testified that the number of 
vehicles attempting to enter the parking lot at the peak entering hour 
was far lower than the number of cars attempting to exit at the peak 
exiting hour. Neither of these conclusions has been contradicted. 
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Furthermore, the Temple's peak hours of operation would 
fall on Sunday evenings from four to nine p.m. According to 
Maris's uncontradicted testimony, which was based on his 
personal knowledge and study of local traffic conditions, 
Route 1 & 9 is not heavily trafficked during those hours. 
Maris testified that the traffic problems on Routes 1 & 9 
occur during weekday commuter hours. Although BAPS 
does offer services during those hours, its experience at its 
Edison facility reflects that week-day services are sparsely 
attended, usually drawing only 10-15 worshipers. 
 
Finally, the Board's concern about parking also lacks a 
foundation. Here, again, the Board r elied on the testimony 
of Simoff, a non-lawyer, who opined that, based on his 
reading of the Taco Bell lease, T aco Bell was entitled to 65 
parking spaces. The lease, however, is silent on the issue of 
parking.5 Moreover, Simoff 's testimony was contradicted by 
that of North Bergen's own town planner , who testified that 
Taco Bell needed only 27 spaces, which would leave BAPS 
with more than enough parking for a temple with an 
occupancy limit of 505. Finally, we note that, four years 
ago, this Board approved the use of this very site as a 
nightclub. Although the nightclub's occupancy limit was 
700, the Board expressed no concer n over the amount of 
available parking. The existence of this prior appr oval calls 
into question the genuineness of the BOA's contention that 
it denied the BAPS application due to inadequate parking.6 
 
Even if there were some factual basis for the concerns 
articulated by the Board, we would still affirm the judgment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We also note that, although Taco Bell has received notice of the 
existing action, it has not appeared to defend its right to any parking 
spaces. 
 
6. The dissent asserts that the BOA approved the use of the site as a 
nightclub because a nightclub attracts patrons"late at night when street 
parking may be more available and trafficflow is lighter." (D.C. at 18) 
This is pure speculation. Nothing in the r ecord suggests that parking on 
Route 1 and 9 is available late at night, but not on Sunday evenings. 
Moreover, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, Maris testified that entry 
into and exit from the parking lot would be mor e evenly spread 
throughout the temple's hours of operation than would entry to and exit 
from a church or synagogue. He stated that, at BAPS's temple in Edison, 
"people kept coming in throughout the day." 
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of the District Court because the Board shirked its duty 
under Sica to seriously consider conditions designed to 
alleviate any negative impact that would flow fr om the grant 
of the variance. The record reveals that BAPS proposed 
numerous conditions,7 fr om reducing the size of its prayer 
hall to reducing the occupancy limit of its temple, which 
should have quieted the Board's concerns about over-use, 
parking and traffic. The Board rebuf fed all of these 
proposals for no apparent reason. Its president simply 
concluded that "no organization would voluntarily limit its 
membership." 
 
Finally, we also note that the Bankruptcy Court vacated 
the condition that the Board ultimately chose to impose on 
BAPS's use of the site, the hiring of off-duty police officers 
at BAPS's expense to direct traffic and monitor compliance 
with the occupancy limit. We agree with the Bankruptcy 
Court that this condition was arbitrary and unr easonable. 
The Board refused to allow BAPS's own volunteers to direct 
traffic and monitor occupancy, concluding that they could 
not be trusted to do so. We believe that this conclusion, 
which has no basis in the record, further supports the 
Bankruptcy Court's decision that the Board acted 
arbitrarily and unreasonably in denying the variance. 
 
IV. 
 
In sum, we agree with the Bankruptcy Court that the 
Board acted arbitrarily and unreasonably. The judgment of 
the District Court will be affirmed. Costs taxed against 
appellant. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The dissent believes that it was reasonable for the BOA to question 
whether BAPS would be willing to turn people away at the door once 505 
people had entered the temple if there was room for more. (Dis. op. at 
17). On the contrary, it is unreasonable and unfair for the BOA to 
postulate in the absence of any evidence that BAPS would violate its 
agreement to limit occupancy. Occupancy limits are quite common in 
dance halls, dining rooms, elevators and other structures. Besides, if 
BAPS were to violate this condition of the variance, the Township has a 
legal remedy by injunction or rescission of the variance. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent for two reasons. First, unlike the 
majority, I do not think that the decision of the Board of 
Adjustment ("BOA") denying the variance was arbitrary or 
capricious. Second, I do not believe that the Bankruptcy 
Court's Opinion vacating the condition that the BOA 
ultimately chose to apply -- the hiring of of f-duty police 
officers -- is properly before us for review. 
 
I. 
 
The New Jersey Legislature has delegated the power to 
grant or deny variances to local boards of adjustment. See 
N.J. Stat. S 40:55D-70. However, the Legislature has 
restricted that power in the following manner: 
 
       No variance or other relief may be granted under the 
       terms of this section, including a variance or other 
       relief involving an inherently beneficial use, without a 
       showing that such variance or other relief can be 
       granted without substantial detriment to the public 
       good and will not substantially impair the intent and 
       purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance. 
 
N.J. Stat. S 40:55D-70(d) (2000). 
 
In other words, a board must deny a variance if it finds 
either that the variance would ultimately result in a 
"substantial detriment to the public good" or that the 
variance would "substantially impair the intent and 
purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance." In this 
case, the BOA unanimously found that denial of BAPS's 
application was mandated by the parking and traffic 
problems that granting the variance would cause. P.A. 451. 
 
"Review of the decision of a board of adjustment . . . 
begins with the recognition that the boar d's decision is 
presumptively valid and is reversible only if arbitrary, 
capricious, and unreasonable. Underlying the pr esumption 
is the recognition that such boards possess special 
knowledge of local conditions and must be accor ded wide 
latitude in the exercise of their discr etion." Sica v. Bd. Of 
Adjustment, 127 N.J. 152, 166-67, 603 A.2d 30, 37-38 
(1992) (citations omitted). "[A] reviewing court [may not] 
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`suggest a decision that may be better than the one made 
by the . . . planning board,' we merely`determine whether 
the board could reasonably have reached its decision.' " 
Pullen v. Township of S. Plainfield Planning Bd., 291 N.J. 
Super. 1, 6-7, 676 A.2d 1095, 1097 (App. Div. 1996) 
(quoting Davis Enters. v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 485, 523 
A.2d 137, 141 (1987)). Moreover, the bur den on a party is 
even greater when challenging the denial of a variance than 
when challenging the approval of a variance. See Nynex 
Mobile Communications Co. v. Hazlet Township Zoning Bd. 
of Adjustment, 276 N.J. Super. 598, 609, 648 A.2d 724, 
730 (App. Div. 1994) (citing Cerdel Constr . Co. v. Township 
Comm., 430 A.2d 925 (1981)). "Thus, an applicant bears a 
heavy burden in overcoming a denial." Id. 
 
The majority rejects the BOA's two main r easons for 
denying the variance--a shortage of parking and traffic 
problems--holding that "[t]he r ecord shows little support for 
. . . these concerns." Maj. at 8. The record, however, 
contains more than sufficient evidence for the BOA's 
decision to withstand review. 
 
BAPS does not contend that it was inappropriate for the 
BOA to consider parking and traffic problems in making its 
decision on the variance. See Price Co. v. Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment, 297 N.J. Super. 327, 331-32, 652 A.2d 784, 
787 (Law. Div. 1993). Nor does BAPS contend that the BOA 
acted unreasonably in refusing to grant its application for 
a variance as it was initially presented to the BOA. Rather, 
BAPS challenges the BOA's refusal to accept its proposal to 
limit occupancy to 505 people as a solution to the 
detrimental effects of the proposed temple--a temple still 
capable of accommodating 1500-1600 people.1 P.A. 253. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Notably, while BAPS proposed to limit the occupants to 505 people 
and to rearrange the interior of the temple so that the prayer hall would 
be suitable for 505 people, BAPS never offer ed to reduce the overall 
square-footage of the temple, which would still remain capable of holding 
1500-1600 people. The majority apparently holds that the BOA's 
decision to focus on the gross square footage of the temple rather than 
on the square footage of the prayer hall alone was arbitrary and 
capricious. I find no support for the conclusion that no reasonable 
person could focus on the gross capacity of the temple. 
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Under the Sica test, the BOA was first r equired to 
"reduce the detrimental effect [of granting the proposed 
variance] by imposing reasonable conditions on the use 
. . . . [and] then weigh the positive and negative criteria and 
determine whether, on balance, the grant of the variance 
would cause a substantial detriment to the public good." 
Sica, 127 N.J. at 166, 603 A.2d at 37. The BOA r ejected the 
proposed occupancy limit as an invalid "r easonable 
condition on the use" for three reasons. The BOA 
determined (1) that the proposed conditions did not 
sufficiently eliminate the parking and traffic problems; (2) 
that BAPS would be unable to impose the proposed 
conditions effectively; and (3) that BAPS would be unlikely 
to adhere to the proposed conditions. Each of these reasons 
is supported by substantial evidence and thus pr ovides an 
adequate basis for the BOA's denial of the variance. 
 
i. 
 
First, the BOA reasonably found that, even with the 
occupancy limit of 505, the proposed BAPS temple would 
cause a substantial detriment to the public good with 
respect to parking and traffic. See Price Co. v. Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment, 279 N.J. Super. 327, 328-29, 652 A.2d 784, 
785 (Super Ct. 1993). 
 
Testifying about parking, the BAPS expert, Michael Maris, 
and the BOA's expert, Hal Simoff,2  agreed that the temple 
would need one parking space for approximately every 3.3 
occupants. P.A. 131; 264. Thus, the temple would need 153 
spaces to accommodate 505 people. The parking lot that 
the proposed temple site shares with a T aco Bell has a total 
of 193 spaces. Therefore, if Taco Bell owns only 27 spaces, 
as BAPS contends, there was enough parking for 505 
people; conversely, if Taco Bell owns 64 spaces, as the BOA 
contends, then enough parking does not exist. 
 
The only testimony as to the number of parking spaces 
that Taco Bell owns came from Simof f, who opined, based 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The BOA hired Simoff to study the parking and traffic effects of the 
proposed temple and to make an independent r ecommendation on 
whether the variance should be granted. 
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on his examination of the Taco Bell lease and his 
measurements of the property, that T aco Bell owns 64 
spaces. P.A. 261-62. BAPS's figure of 27 spaces is based 
entirely on the testimony of Town Planner Michael Kauker, 
who stated that Taco Bell "could use 27 spaces" -- which 
meant that the zoning laws would be satisfied if T aco Bell 
had a minimum of 27 spaces. P.A. 11-12. This fact has 
little logical relationship to the number of spaces that Taco 
Bell owns and thus does not undermine Simof f 's 
testimony. 
 
The majority dismisses Simoff 's testimony on this point 
partly because he is not a lawyer and because T aco Bell 
has "not appeared to defend its right to a certain number 
of parking spaces." Maj. at 9 fn.5. Simof f 's lack of a law 
degree was a fact that the BOA could have considered in 
assessing the weight to assign to his opinion, but this fact 
did not make it unreasonable for the BOA to accept his 
testimony. Moreover, I fail to see the significance for present 
purposes of Taco Bell's failure to appear in the federal court 
proceedings. Taco Bell is not bound by the decision in this 
case, and it is not difficult to think of business reasons why 
it might have chosen not to appear. 
 
As for traffic, Simoff and Maris disagr eed over the ability 
of Route 1 & 9, a state highway, to absorb the traffic that 
the temple would generate. The BOA President r easonably 
worried that Route 1 & 9 "is a heavily trafficked road . . . . 
It will be a mess. [Cars] will be lined up on[Route 1 & 9], 
trying to get in.". P.A. 447. Another BOA member noted that 
when discussing "[Route] 1 & 9, you'r e talking a state 
highway. It's treacherous. Exiting and entering anywhere 
on [Route 1 & 9] for one car, you'r e taking your life in your 
hands." P.A. 448-49. 
 
The BOA heard conflicting expert testimony on the 
impact that the proposed temple would have on traffic. 
Simoff testified that the traffic volume along Route 1 & 9 at 
the temple site during peak midday hours was 1600 
vehicles/hour. P.A. 228. He further testified that the temple 
would generate 168 vehicles/hour exiting during peak time. 
P.A. 231. According to Simoff 's computer modeling, under 
these conditions, Route 1 & 9 at the temple driveway would 
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operate at Level of Service F.3  P.A. 236. Simoff characterized 
this level of service as "unacceptable under any conditions." 
P.A. 237. 
 
Maris agreed that Level of Service F is unacceptable, but 
he testified that, with the temple, the Level of Service would 
be "C" -- a negative impact of only one service level from its 
current service level of "B." P.A. 144-45. Maris 
characterized this as "an acceptable impact on traffic." P.A. 
145. 
 
The majority holds that it was unreasonable for the BOA 
to accept Simoff 's testimony because, on cross- 
examination, Simoff admitting making a minor error in 
calculation. The main difference between Simoff 's 
conclusion and Maris's came from their use of different 
"peak hour factors"4 -- Simoff testified that he used a peak 
hour factor of .7 in his calculations, P.A. 292, while Maris 
testified that he used a peak hour factor of .91. P.A. 148. 
Simoff admitted on cross-examination that the correct peak 
hour factor was .82--barely closer to that used by Maris 
than to that used by Simoff. P.A. 293-94. Nevertheless, 
using the correct peak hour factor, Simoff calculated the 
entryway would still be classified as Level of Service D. P.A. 
294. 
 
Weighing witness credibility is the pr ovince of the BOA,5 
and the BOA was entitled to accept Simoff 's opinion 
despite his initial error. Simof f admitted that neither he nor 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Planners refer to "Levels of Service" when measuring the traffic flow 
of 
a road and its corresponding ability to accept traffic entering from a 
driveway or connecting roadway. Level of Service A means that the 
average delay for a vehicle waiting to enter is less than 10 seconds per 
vehicle, and Level of Service F means that the delay is greater than 50 
seconds per vehicle. P.A. 144-45; 236-37. 
 
4. The "peak hour factor" is a factor used in the calculation of a road's 
level of service. The peak hour factor compensates for the fact that cars 
will not attempt to exit a driveway uniformly throughout the peak hour. 
P.A. 149. 
 
5. See Beverly Calif. Corp. v. NLRB, 227 F.3d 817, 830 (7th Cir. 2000); 
Hambsch v. Department of the Treasury , 796 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 
1986); Baghdikian v. Bd. of Adjustment, 247 N.J. Super 45, 48-49, 588 
A.2d 846, 848 (App. Div. 1991). 
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Maris used the correct peak hour factor in their 
application, and that the real peak hour factor lay 
somewhere in between, only slightly closer to Maris's 
number than to his own. Moreover, the error would not 
have changed his ultimate conclusion. Lastly, the error in 
calculation related only to the ability of cars to exit the 
proposed temple's parking lot, leaving unaf fected any 
conclusions about the capacity of the parking lot or the 
ability of cars to enter the parking lot. Under these 
circumstances, Simoff may have been slightly "discredited," 
as the majority claims, but I do not believe that it was 
unreasonable for the BOA to accept any of Simof f 's 
testimony, as the majority effectively holds. See Todd v. 
Sheridan, 268 N.J. Super. 387, 400, 633 A.2d 1009, 1016 
(App. Div. 1993) ("The finder of fact is fr ee to accept all, 
some, or none of an expert witness's opinion."). Moreover, 
accepting Simoff 's revised testimony, I do not believe that 
the Board unreasonably decided that a decr ease from Level 
of Service B to Level of Service D constituted a substantial 
detriment to the public good. 
 
ii. 
 
Second, the BOA reasonably questioned whether BAPS 
could adhere to the proposed restriction. The BOA 
President worried that "it would not be feasible to tell a 
person that he or she could not attend services." P.A. 448. 
This concern is neither arbitrary nor capricious. Under 
Sica, the BOA is required to consider only "reasonable 
conditions." Sica, 127 N.J. at 166, 603 A.2d at 37. A 
condition that is not feasible certainly does not qualify as a 
reasonable condition. 
 
The majority does not address the specifics of how BAPS 
will prevent more than 505 people fr om attempting to come 
to services. If the number of cars coming to the temple site 
exceeds the number of parking spaces, it is pr edictable that 
some people who wish to attend services and who know 
that there is space for them in the temple will park their 
cars illegally on adjoining streets and then walk to the 
temple. This would create a very danger ous situation. P.A. 
227-28. 
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Simoff recommended that the variance be granted if 
BAPS would reduce the square footage of the temple to a 
size suitable for an occupancy of approximately 450 people. 
P.A. 299 & 398-400. However, none of BAPS's proposals 
show a willingness to reduce the size of the temple. Thus, 
even if enough parking existed on the site for an occupancy 
limit of 505, it was not unreasonable for the BOA to reject 
the limitation of occupancy as not being a "r easonable 
condition." 
 
iii. 
 
Third, the BOA reasonably questioned whether BAPS 
would adhere to the proposed restriction. The BOA 
President doubted whether BAPS "would voluntarily limit 
its membership." P.A. 448. It was r easonable for the BOA to 
question whether BAPS would be willing to tur n people 
away at the door once 505 people had entered the temple, 
even though there would still be room for 995 to 1095 
attendees. 
 
In questioning BAPS's willingness to do this, the BOA 
only partially relied on Simoff 's testimony regarding the 
alleged over-occupancy of BAPS's temple in Edison. The 
BOA President made the common-sense comment that "I, 
for one, do not believe that any organization would 
voluntarily limit its membership." P.A. 447. In other words, 
he doubted BAPS's willingness to turn away people who 
wished to enter the temple to worship even though there 
was plenty of room for them inside. This view was well 
within the bounds of reason. 
 
The majority questions the BOA's sincerity because the 
BOA previously granted a variance for the operation of a 
nightclub on the same property. Maj. at 9. However, as far 
as I am aware, BAPS itself has never questioned the BOA's 
motives. I would view this case quite differ ently if there 
were any suggestion that the BOA harbor ed any bias 
towards BAPS or its members, but I am awar e of no such 
evidence. Furthermore, the parking and traffic concerns 
associated with a nightclub can be very differ ent from those 
associated with a house of worship. The temple's main 
services would be on Sunday, with other services on 
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weekday afternoons. See P.A. 177-78 (BAPS's schedule of 
services). A nightclub would normally draw patrons only 
late at night, when parking may be more available and 
traffic flow is lighter. Also, it is likely that the arrival and 
departure of patrons of a nightclub would be more evenly 
spaced over its hours of operation, whereas the proposed 
BAPS temple could generate mass entry and exodus at 
specific times. In any event, we do not have befor e us the 
record concerning the BOA's pr evious grant of a variance, 
making it impossible to draw conclusions as to pr opriety of 
an analogy between the nightclub and the proposed temple.6 
 
II. 
 
I also note that the BOA's later decision to impose the 
condition of hiring off-duty police officers at BAPS's expense 
to monitor traffic is not properly befor e us. The BOA 
imposed the condition on December 1, 1999, a week after 
filing the notice of appeal to the District Court in this case. 
The Bankruptcy Court subsequently vacated the condition 
on January 7, 2000. The BOA has not appealed that 
decision, nor does it raise the issue in its brief. See Brief of 
Appellant at 14 (disavowing a challenge to the Bankruptcy 
Court's order vacating the condition). Indeed, the majority's 
conclusion that there is nothing in the r ecord to support 
the condition is self-evident, since the Boar d was ordered 
by the Bankruptcy Court to begin considering r easonable 
conditions on November 29, 1999, whereas we have no 
record before us concerning any BOA actions or meetings 
occurring after October 9, 1999. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Majority implies that it was per se unr easonable for the Board to 
rely upon common knowledge as well as its weighing of the credibility of 
the BAPS petitioners to reach the conclusion that BAPS would probably 
not adhere to the occupancy limit. Maj. at 9 n.7. If this were the case, 
then it would form the basis for a blanket rule that, no matter how 
preposterously low the proposed occupancy limit was when compared to 
the designs of and intended use for the building, a Board of Assessment 
must accept a petitioners proposed occupancy limit. This cannot be the 
case. 
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III. 
 
In sum, the majority disregards the long-standing 
proposition that "[a]n abuse of discr etion does not exist 
simply because we disagree with the [finder of fact's] 
decision." Barnes Foundation v. T ownship of Lower Merion, 
242 F.3d 151, 167 (3d Cir. 2001) (Nygaard, J., dissenting). 
" `Abuse' itself is a serious accusation and in using the term 
`abuse' to define our standard of r eview, our jurisprudence 
has recognized the institutional superiority of the [finder of 
fact]. Therefore, we should not r eadily discard its findings 
and conclusions." Id. 
 
Because I believe that the BOA's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence and is not arbitrary or capricious, I 
would reverse the decision of the District Court and sustain 
that of the BOA. 
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